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The availability and adequacy of technical
remedies ought to play a crucial role in evaluating
the propriety of state action with regard to both
the inhibition of Internet pornography and the
promotion of Internet privacy. Legislation that
would have restricted Internet speech considered
indecent or harmful to minors has already faced
and failed that test. Several prominent organiza-
tions dedicated to preserving civil liberties argued
successfully that self-help technologies offered
less-restrictive means of achieving the purported
ends of such legislation, rendering it unconstitu-
tional. Surprisingly, those same organizations
have of late joined the call for subjecting another
kind of speech—speech by commercial entities
about Internet users—to political regulation.
With regard to privacy no less than pornography,
however, self-help offers Internet users a less-
restrictive means of preventing the alleged harms
of free speech than does state action. Indeed, a
review of privacy-protecting technologies shows
them to work even more effectively than the fil-
tering and blocking software used to combat
online smut. Digital self-help in defense of
Internet privacy makes regulation by state
authorities not only constitutionally suspect but,
from the more general point of view of policy,
functionally inferior.
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Introduction
Pornography tends to generate social stig-
ma. Privacy tends to alleviate it. That the two
frequently coexist reflects little more than
the phenomenon of shame. Pornography
and privacy share a more subtle relationship
in Internet law and policy, however, because
the propriety of legislation affecting either
pornography or privacy should depend cru-
cially on the availability of alternative self-
help remedies, such as special software or
communications services, that each individ-
ual can secure for him- or herself through
technical rather than political means.
Legislation that attempted to restrict
Internet speech considered indecent or
harmful to minors has already had to face
that exacting test. This paper argues that pro-
posals to regulate Internet privacy merit sim-
ilar scrutiny.
The same points that have helped strike
down statutory limits on Internet speech
thought harmful to its readers (because it is
indecent or harmful to minors) argue against
enacting new statutory limits on speech
thought harmful to its subjects (i.e., privacy
legislation). In both cases, self-help offers
Internet users a less-restrictive means of pre-
venting the alleged harms caused by free
speech than does legislation. In both cases,
the alternative offered by digital self-help
makes regulation by state authorities not
only constitutionally suspect but, from the
more general points of view of policy and
effectiveness, functionally inferior.
Admittedly, that critique might strike
some readers as distinctly unfashionable.
Many and diverse voices have of late called
for using political means to regulate speech
by commercial entities about Internet users
in the name of protecting privacy. That rising
chorus includes the American Civil Liberties
Union, the Electronic Privacy Information
Center, and the Center for Democracy and
Technology. Far from advancing the case for
protecting Internet privacy through new reg-
ulations, however, those same three organiza-
tions have elsewhere advanced arguments
that counsel against regulatory initiatives.
Indeed, the ACLU, EPIC, and CDT success-
fully fought legislative attempts to regulate
indecent or harmful-to-minors speech on the
Internet by arguing, in relevant part, that self-
help offered a less-restrictive means of achiev-
ing the same ends. It turns out that self-help
has an even greater edge over legislation when
it comes to Internet privacy. Internet users can
protect their privacy, and—following the argu-
ments made by the ACLU, EPIC, and CDT—
the ready availability of self-help alternatives
casts constitutional doubt on legislation that
would censor speech alleged to violate
Internet users’ privacy rights. Even apart from
such purely legal questions, the efficacy of self-
help renders such legislation suspect from a
policy point of view.
Given the range of discussions taking place
about Internet privacy, the relatively narrow
scope of the present paper bears emphasis. It
primarily concerns the legal impact that self-
help remedies ought to have on legislation
that would restrict speech by commercial enti-
ties about Internet users. More generally, but
secondarily, it offers a policy-based critique of
legislative proposals to regulate commercial
activity that does not win First Amendment
protection and that affects the privacy of
Internet users, such as monitoring click
streams or using persistent cookies. The rela-
tive merits of trying to protect Internet privacy
through direct legislation, delegation of broad
authority to an existing or new agency, or
some other form of state action do not matter
much for this analysis, which regards all such
actions as susceptible to similar criticism. The
discussion herein of the First Amendment, of
course, concerns the U.S. legal system, though
many of the observations about law and poli-
cy might well apply to other systems. This
paper does not concern state action that
threatens privacy rights, issues raised by inter-
national variation in privacy regulations, or
esoteric questions about the relationship
between privacy and conceptions of self. It
does not discuss the prospect of censoring
speech by noncommercial entities about
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Internet users, solely because little risk of such
regulation looms. If that sort of legislation
surfaces, however, the arguments set forth
here should for the most part prove applicable
and, indeed, apply with even more force than
when restricted to the defense of commercial
entities.
The Demand for 
Internet Privacy
Judging by what they tell pollsters,
Internet users worry a great deal about priva-
cy. A Pew survey conducted from May 19 to
June 21, 2000, found 54 percent of American
Internet users “very concerned” that personal
information about them or their families
would find its way to businesses or
strangers.1 Perhaps unsurprisingly, 86 per-
cent of those respondents favored an “opt-
in” approach to Internet privacy, under
which no Internet company would use such
information unless expressly authorized to
do so.2 Similarly, a Harris poll taken in March
2000 found that 56 percent of respondents
claimed they would, if given the choice,
always opt out of providing Web sites with
personal information.3 Eighty-eight percent
said that they would prefer every Web site to
ask for permission before sharing their per-
sonal information with other parties.4
What Internet users actually do about pri-
vacy sends a distinctly different message
from what they say, however. The Pew survey
found that 64 percent of Internet users
would provide personal information if neces-
sary to access a Web site5 and that only 24
percent of Internet users who know about
cookies6 have configured their Web browsers
to reject them.7 The Harris poll discovered
that only 19 percent of Internet users make a
habit of reading Web sites’ privacy notices.8
Studying deeds rather than words, moreover,
reveals decreasing concern about Internet
privacy. Harris found that over two years the
percentage of Internet users who refuse to
register at Web sites by offering personal
information has dropped from 59 percent to
46 percent.9 More recently, the Pew study put
that figure at a mere 27 percent.10
Nonetheless, consistent with what they
say when polled (rather than what they do
online) many Internet users demand
stronger laws protecting online privacy. Fifty-
seven percent of respondents to the Harris
poll agreed, “The government should pass
laws now for how personal information can
be collected and used on the Internet.”1 1
Three-quarters of those surveyed by ABC
News said it should be illegal for companies
to sell information about what consumers
buy on the Internet.1 2
Those results hardly reflect balanced
assessments of the costs and benefits of reg-
ulating speech about Internet users, of
course. Many consumers would casually
approve of abolishing credit reports, too,
without reckoning the resulting impact on
their access to credit cards or home mort-
gages. And the gap between words and deeds,
not to mention the various other interpreta-
tion problems that plague polls,1 3 suggests
that no one should consume complaints
about Internet privacy without a side order of
salt. Nonetheless, surveys uncovering con-
cern about Internet privacy appear to have
encouraged regulators, politicians, and
activists to take action.
Impressed by such polls and impatient
with the slow pace of industry self-regula-
tion, in May 2000 the Federal Trade
Commission called for new legislation pro-
tecting the privacy of Internet users.1 4
Congress has already taken under considera-
tion such bills as the Consumer Internet
Privacy Enhancement Act,15 the Consumer
Privacy Protection Act,1 6 and the Consumer
Internet Privacy Protection Act of 1999,1 7
although none has yet to pass. President
Bush would likely sign those kinds of protec-
tions into law.18 He has signaled his support
of legislation giving greater privacy protec-
tion to Internet users. Regulators and politi-
cians can count on influential activist orga-
nizations to support the call for new laws
protecting Internet privacy, including, most
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notably for present purposes, the ACLU,
EPIC, and CDT. The ACLU has called for leg-
islation to mandate, among other things,
that personal information about Internet
users never be collected or distributed with-
out their knowledge and consent; that any
organization collecting personally identifi-
able information from Internet users inform
them why it is doing so; that organizations
not reuse such information for any other
purpose without a user’s consent; and that
every Internet user have the right to examine,
copy and correct personal information.1 9
EPIC has advocated regulations that would
impose confidentiality obligations on
Internet consumer data and limit the collec-
tion of personal data to “necessary” purpos-
es.2 0 CDT’s staff counsel, Deirdre Mulligan,
has testified to Congress that “we must
adopt legislation that incorporates into law
Fair Information Practices—long-accepted
principles specifying that individuals should
be able to ‘determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about
them is shared.’”2 1
That the ACLU, EPIC, and CDT have
good intentions about protecting the privacy
of Internet users should surprise no one.
That they propose remedies that would regu-
late speech should perhaps raise eyebrows,
however. The arguments that the ACLU,
EPIC, and CDT once employed in defense of
indecent or harmful-to-minors speech on the
Internet also apply to the restrictions that
they would now impose on another type of
speech: speech by commercial entities about
Internet users. 
Digital Self-Help versus
Regulation of 
Pornographic Speech
The ACLU, EPIC, and CDT successfully
challenged the constitutionality of legisla-
tion restricting Internet speech classified as
indecent or harmful to minors by arguing
that the availability of self-help alternatives
disqualified such laws as the “least restrictive
means” of regulating constitutionally pro-
tected speech.2 2 Those organizations have
leveled the same claim against the Commun-
ications Decency Act of 1996, the Child
Online Protection Act,2 3 and New Mexico’s2 4
and New York’s25 COPA-like state laws. This
part describes the application in those cases
of the argument that the availability of digi-
tal self-help made legislative restrictions on
Internet speech unnecessary, excessive, and,
thus, unconstitutional.
Let us start with the Communications
Decency Act.2 6The ACLU and EPIC joined in
arguing before the Supreme Court that the
CDA unconstitutionally limited indecent
speech on the Internet because private filter-
ing options offered an alternative to a state
prohibition on indecent Internet speech.2 7
Contrary to the government’s assertion that
there existed no equally effective alternative
to the CDA’s criminal ban on indecent
speech, the plaintiffs observed that the trial
court had “found that the existing software
affords parents a significant option for pro-
tecting children” and that the government
itself had admitted to a growing and com-
petitive market for self-help tools.2 8 The
plaintiffs also cited protections available
through the major commercial online ser-
vices and technical standards then under
development that would facilitate user-based
blocking of indecent Internet speech.2 9
The CDT, in its capacity as a member of
the plaintiff Citizens’ Internet Empower-
ment Coalition, backed a similar analysis in
its Supreme Court brief, which cited the
availability of blocking and filtering software
as proof that the CDA was “unconstitutional
because there are less restrictive measures
Congress could have selected that would
have been much more effective in preventing
minors from gaining access to indecent
online material.”3 0 The self-help arguments
used by the ACLU, EPIC, and CDT apparent-
ly proved convincing; the Supreme Court
struck down the CDA because it did not offer
the least-restrictive means of achieving the
government’s goals.3 1
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The ACLU and EPIC again joined forces
in challenging COPA, a statute that by tar-
geting speech harmful to minors, rather than
all types of indecent speech, aimed to avoid
the overbreadth that had rendered the CDA
unconstitutional. As in their earlier attack on
the CDA, the ACLU and EPIC argued that
the availability of self-help alternatives
demonstrated the Child Online Protection
Act’s unconstitutionality: “There are numer-
ous less restrictive and more effective alterna-
tives to COPA, including user-based filtering
software, that parents may use if they wish to
restrict what their children view.”3 2Again, the
argument succeeded. The trial court granted
a preliminary injunction on enforcement of
the statute, observing that “blocking or fil-
tering technology may be at least as success-
ful as COPA would be in restricting minors’
access to harmful material online without
imposing the burden on constitutionally
protected speech that COPA imposes on
adult users or Web site operators.”3 3
Although the third circuit affirmed the
injunction on COPA’s enforcement on
appeal, it expressed reservations about the
self-help argument. It opined that the block-
ing and filtering technologies cited by the
trial court “do not constitute government
action, and we do not consider this to be a
lesser restrictive means for the government to
achieve its compelling interest.”3 4As explana-
tion, the appellate court offered no more
than an unsupported claim that “the
parental hand should not be looked to as a
substitute for a congressional mandate.”3 5
That seems an unjustifiably narrow interpre-
tation of the “least restrictive means” test,
however. Congress can boast of no mandate
to legislate in contravention of the First
Amendment, after all, and the Supreme
Court has made clear that the availability of
superior private alternatives can strip law-
makers of legitimate power to restrict free
speech.3 6 To put the matter more generally
and in economic terms, lawmakers must bear
the burden of justifying their actions by
proof of a salient and serious market failure.
Under either analysis, a full inquiry into the
“least restrictive means” of correcting a prob-
lem must consider effective self-help as an
alternative to state action.
Perhaps the third circuit found it sugges-
tive that in ACLU v. Reno the Supreme Court,
when listing possible alternatives to the
CDA, included only those involving state
action.3 7 That supposed limitation would
hardly justify limiting inquiries under the
“least restrictive means” test to government
action, however, since context indicates that
the Supreme Court meant only to scold the
legislature for failing to pass a different “pro-
vision”—not to comment on the govern-
ment’s failure to consider self-help reme-
dies.3 8 So far as reading judicial tea leaves
goes, the Third Circuit should have pondered
why the Supreme Court stated for the record:
“Systems have been developed to help par-
ents control the material that may be avail-
able on a home computer with Internet
access.”3 9 As if to answer that question, the
Supreme Court had already explained ACLU
v. Reno in terms that cast sharp doubt on the
Third Circuit’s refusal to regard self-help as
an alternative to state action: “The mere pos-
sibility that user-based Internet screening
software would ‘soon be widely available’ was
relevant to our rejection of an overbroad
restriction of indecent cyberspeech.”4 0
The ACLU has also used the self-help argu-
ment in challenging state laws similar to
COPA. As proof that a New Mexico statute4 1
criminalizing the dissemination of Internet
speech harmful to minors failed to represent
the least restrictive means of effectuating the
government’s interest, the ACLU cited “many
alternative means that are more effective at
assisting parents in limiting a minor’s access
to certain material if desired.”4 2The trial court
granted a preliminary injunction on the
statute’s effectiveness, noting the existence of
“a wide range of mechanisms that parents can
use to prevent their children from accessing
material online they do not want their chil-
dren to view,”4 3 and the Tenth Circuit
affirmed.4 4 The ACLU made the same argu-
ment in its complaint45 against a New York
law that criminalized Internet speech harmful
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to minors.46 Here, though, the trial court
granted a preliminary injunction without
addressing such First Amendment claims,
basing its decision solely on grounds that the
act interfered with interstate commerce.4 7
Self-Help versus Regulation
of Commercial Speech
Digital self-help makes unnecessary state
action limiting speech that is indecent or
harmful to minors. The same argument
applies to state action that would limit
speech by commercial entities about Internet
users. Digital self-help offers more hope of
protecting Internet users’ privacy than it does
of effectively filtering out unwanted speech,
and the availability of such self-help casts
doubt on the constitutionality of legislation
restricting speech by commercial entities
about Internet users. From the more general
point of view of policy, moreover, digital self-
help offers a better approach to protecting
Internet privacy than does state action.
The Efficacy of Self-Help in Protecting
Internet Privacy
Digital self-help offers what may be the
only viable solution to protecting Internet pri-
vacy. Consider the many types of self-help
already available. Internet users who worry
about cookies can simply configure their
browsers to reject them—a process that takes
about 15 seconds.48 Though that will cut off
access to sites that admit only registered users,
advanced self-help measures can both preserve
access to such sites and bar offensive cookies.
More cautious Internet users can download
software like AdSubtract,49 IDcide Privacy
Companion,5 0 PC Magazine’s CookieCop,5 1
Siemens’ WebWasher,52 Internet Junkbuster,5 3
or Guidescope,54 all of which offer more pre-
cise control over cookies and all of which are
free of charge. Privacy Companion, to pick
one, distinguishes between cookies that give
you access to a particular site’s personalized
services and cookies that advertisers might use
to track your movements across the net.5 5
Internet users who demand still more privacy
can buy Freedom56 software to browse the net
under disguise of a pseudonym or subscribe to
Anonymizer.com’s5 7or or SafeWeb.com’s ser-
vices5 8 to become completely invisible to
online merchants. In sum, then, Internet users
already enjoy a variety of cheap and effective
tools for protecting privacy online.5 9 If con-
sumer demand reflects poll results, moreover,
entrepreneurs will have ample incentives to
create tools that protect Internet privacy even
more cheaply and effectively.6 0
Such privacy-protecting services differ in
one crucial regard from services that try to
filter out offensive speech: they work better.
Because meaning depends on context, filter-
ing software has trouble distinguishing blue-
footed and winged “boobies” from the
human variety. More fundamentally, no one
has yet figured out how to encode in software
the difficult moral reasoning that responsi-
ble parents and teachers use to raise kids
right. Privacy-protecting services tackle a
comparatively simple technical problem.
That they will not solve it perfectly matters
little; they need only protect privacy better
than political action can.6 1 On that count,
privacy-protecting services have a great edge
over filtering software. The same “least
restrictive means” test that applies to other
types of constitutionally protected speech
also applies to speech by commercial entities
about Internet consumers and ought to
apply with even greater force.
The Constitutionality of Regulating
Commercial Entities’ Speech about
Internet Users
But should state action regulating speech
by commercial entities about Internet con-
sumers have to pass the “least restrictive
means” test? Does such speech qualify, in
other words, for the same level of constitu-
tional protection afforded to indecent and
harmful-to-minors speech? In brief: maybe it
does, but that probably does not matter.
Although an exhaustive answer would exceed
the bounds of the present paper62 and would
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lack the guide of controlling case law,6 3 this
section offers a quick explanation of that
conclusion. 
Speech by commercial entities about
Internet consumers might well qualify for
protection under the “least restrictive means”
test, which courts apply when strictly scruti-
nizing restrictions on ordinary speech—or for
that matter, speech that is indecent or harm-
ful to minors.6 4At a minimum, though, such
speech would almost certainly qualify as
commercial speech,65 which is generally pro-
tected from any regulation that is “more
extensive than is necessary” to serve the gov-
ernment’s alleged interest.66 If a regulation
on commercial speech constitutes a blanket
ban on truthful statements, however—a
description that might well apply to extreme
restrictions on speech by commercial entities
about Internet consumers—the “least restric-
tive means” test would come back into play.6 7
State action restricting speech within or
by commercial entities about Internet users
looks constitutionally suspect even under the
more lax test generally applicable to com-
mercial speech. By way of distinguishing it
from the more demanding “least restrictive
means” test, the Tenth Circuit recently
explained that in applying the “more exten-
sive than is necessary” test:
We do not require the government to
consider every conceivable means
that may restrict less speech and
strike down regulations when any
less restrictive means would suffi-
ciently serve the state interest. We
merely recognize the reality that the
existence of an obvious and substan-
tially less restrictive means for
advancing the desired government
objective indicates a lack of narrow
tailoring.68
The large and growing number of self-help
alternatives for protecting Internet privacy
certainly qualifies them as obvious.
Furthermore, although the ultimate determi-
nation must turn on the facts, the efficiency
of existing self-help protections probably
already qualifies them as less restrictive than
any of the various current proposals to regu-
late speech by commercial entities about
Internet users. 
Self-Help and Public Policy in Protecting
Internet Privacy
Even apart from such constitutional ques-
tions, the availability of so many efficacious
means of protecting Internet privacy
through self-help suggests that legislation
toward the same end could not tout curing
market failure as a justification.6 9Whether a
great many Internet users avail themselves of
such self-help measures has little bearing on
that point, of course.7 0Notwithstanding talk
to the contrary, actions may reveal Internet
users quite willing to trade personal privacy
for access to Web sites.71 As no one has a vest-
ed right to access another’s private Web site,
that quid pro quo should raise no outcry. It
matters most that Internet users have a real-
istic choice between preserving and sacrific-
ing their privacy.7 2Judging by what they tell
pollsters, moreover, an overwhelming major-
ity of Americans think that Internet users—
not government or industry—should bear the
primary responsibility for exercising that
choice.7 3
Legislation protecting Internet privacy
offers little benefit. Moreover, the potential
costs of such legislation are high. The
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of
19987 4 does not give much encouragement
on that count, as it has increased legal uncer-
tainty,75 raised the expense of providing
online services,76 and even forced some com-
panies out of the market for young Internet
users.7 7A more comprehensive statute, cover-
ing not just the privacy of children but also
that of adults, might well generate more
comprehensive problems.
The prospect of having government agen-
cies enforce such a statute should not engen-
der much optimism. Notwithstanding feder-
al law7 8 and a specific White House edict to
the contrary,7 9 federal agencies have largely
failed to implement privacy protections on
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their own Web sites.8 0A privacy audit by the
General Accounting Office found that the
privacy policies of only 46 of the 70 federal
agencies it surveyed fulfilled applicable
requirements.81 More generally, a recent
study showed that state and federal Web sites
routinely fall short of the same privacy-pro-
tection standards that activists would have
government impose on private actors.8 2
Though one might argue that government
agents quite naturally enforce privacy laws
less vigorously against themselves than
against other citizens,8 3somehow that excuse
does not give much comfort.
As a matter of public policy as well as con-
stitutional law, politicians should invoke
state power only to correct manifest failures
of market and other nonpolitical mecha-
nisms to alleviate serious national problems.
Even then, lawmakers should do so only if
the all-too-likely risks of government failure
do not threaten to cancel out the putative
gains of state action.8 4 The benefits, in brief,
must outweigh the costs. Proposals to pass
laws protecting Internet users’ privacy merit
skepticism.8 5
Conclusion
The availability of speech-filtering pro-
grams has already powerfully affected
responses to Internet pornography. The
advent of tools such as cookie-control soft-
ware and anonymizing networks now pre-
sents a similar challenge to the law and policy
on Internet privacy. In each case, the availabil-
ity of self-help alternatives renders state
action suspect on constitutional and policy
grounds. The same activist organizations that
argue against legislation restricting Internet
speech that is indecent or harmful to minors
should reconsider their demands for privacy
legislation that would restrict speech by com-
mercial entities about Internet users.
Politicians and regulators should likewise
question the wisdom of trying to mandate
privacy protections that Internet users can
easily obtain on their own.
This paper began by noting that pornog-
raphy and privacy share bonds based in
shame: what the former heightens, the latter
lessens. It has argued that Internet law and
policy should take account of a more signifi-
cant relationship between pornography and
privacy, one based in the common role that
digital self-help should play in evaluating
state action directed toward either of them.
Even under that analysis, however, one might
well conclude that shame still bonds Internet
pornography and Internet privacy. For it
would indeed prove a shame, with regard to
either, if lawmakers ignored the alternatives
offered by digital self-help and instead enact-
ed unconstitutional, unnecessary, and unjus-
tified regulations.
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